One of the reasons I dislike Persona and believe it's a step in a wrong direction, is that after so many problems we had with various authentication/identity systems it make you lease your own identity from some third party you're forced to trust.
Some say that I can set up my own Persona server, but my problem is that I think one can't really own a domain, only temporarily lease it from a registrar, so it's still the same. In contrast, one can posess a keypair without the necessity of any third parties (and third parties still may confirm the identity).
I understand your concerns, but I think the positive aspects of Persona far outweigh the negative ones. E.g., with Persona it's much easier for users to sign up for a new service because no annoying email validation step is required. The developers of a website benefit from not having to store passwords (they only need to store the email of a user).
It's not that what he's saying actually, that all current easy-to-use systems (from Gmail to disqus) are based somehow on third parties. Your solution is the same, so the privacy breach (theoretically) is there. The good is that I don't have to type passwords and you probably should promote this persona feature a little bit more than the privacy thing, which presumes that we trust a third party while most of us do not.
Good luck anyway, I might try to setup your persona for my website if persona takes off.
Sure, that's what I'm saying too, though. Persona isn't a step backwards, because, at worst, it's equal (and a bit better, privacy-wise) than what we have now. Otherwise, you can set up your own provider and not need to trust anyone else (except the domain provider, I guess, sure).
Indeed, I am thinking of open-sourcing the project so people can host it themselves if they like, while maybe retaining some extra functionality in the hosted version. It does mean that the benefit of easy installation will be negated for self-hosted installations, though.
> It does mean that the benefit of easy installation will be negated for self-hosted installations, though.
...and that's OK. You can offer self-hosted for the paranoid (or those who are not paranoid but merely reasonable and wish to engage in straightforward and legal activity like communicating with government whistle blowers), and offer the hosted version for those who value the ease of use. As a consumer, the fact that you offer both would increase my confidence in the hosted version.
drivebyacct2, your comment is dead, although interesting. I will change the site to mention privacy implications, but what this service can learn about your logins is basically "you asked to be logged in to an unknown site at some known date". Persona itself is designed so that your identity provider doesn't know very much about where you log in.
Replying to drivebyacct2, nope, the protocol doesn't expose where you log in (that was one of their explicit goals). It's also one of the reasons I like Persona so much and decided to make this.
I'm very glad you like it, I am always looking for feedback and would love to see Persona/Persowna gain more users. Please don't hesitate to email me about anything (email is in profile).
To be fair, in practicality it does expose where you log in because that website has to communicate with the persona server. The website could use a proxy or something to try to obfuscate which website it is doing an authentication for, but if there is any significant volume it would surely leak out unless they did it through Tor (and were not the only site doing persona authentication through Tor either).
What the persona protocol explicitly does not leak is each login event, checking in with the persona server only happens once during account setup.
The website grabs a single certificate from the persona server the first time it sees a particular e-mail hosting domain; all this reveals is that someone in that domain (no specifics as to who) tried to log in at the beginning of the lifetime of that certificate in the cache. Until the cache expires, an arbitrary number of users can log in to the site without any communication touching the persona server. It doesn't reveal who logged in, when in the cache lifetime they logged in, or even how many people logged in.
At most that certificate is good for 24 hurs. The user has to get his assertion signed by the identity provider too, and it is possible to get them pre-signed up to that same 24 hours. So the window of users is narrowed to the list of sites that queried the identity provider and the users who had an assertion signed within those 24 hours. Which is weakly anonymous for high-volume sites and no protection at all for low-volume cases.
However, the kicker is the protocol doesn't protect against the identity provider setting the expiration to something like 5 minutes, effectively unmasking the client and the website by requiring them both to talk to identity provider within that 5 minute window.
Hmm, does it? It's been months since I implement the spec, but, from what I recall, you hand the signed assertion to the user and they present it to the site. Am I wrong?
Regarding the comment count drivebyacct2 mentioned, I consider it a good sign when a story has a high upvote/comment ratio. 32/6 (soon to be 7) is pretty good.
Some say that I can set up my own Persona server, but my problem is that I think one can't really own a domain, only temporarily lease it from a registrar, so it's still the same. In contrast, one can posess a keypair without the necessity of any third parties (and third parties still may confirm the identity).