The "e2e" concept that most are familiar with is basically fake: the provider is responsible for the client that does the encryption and decryption. Of course they can break it if forced. Software exploits are a separate matter and also easier to deal with when the end user isn't truly in control of the encryption (or easier if they don't know what they are doing.)

It's more fake because you download the app, look up your friend's number "1-555-333-2222", and your client trusts their server to actually return your friend instead of a MITM. Some asterisks there, but basically it's far from trustless.

Isn't this what the "safety number" in Signal is for? Obviously you are still trusting many other things there (the client software, OS, hardware, whatever out of band method you use to compare the numbers, etc.), but I thought the safety number pretty much addresses the MITM concern specifically, if you bother to check it.

Right, the issue is that nobody checks it and they don't really tell users upfront why they need to. It also notifies you if the number changes later, but seems like that can happen for benign reasons too, so it might go ignored. WhatsApp and Telegram are similar.

Someone could orient an E2EE app around these trusted identities, but it'd probably not be very popular.

I'm quite sure they can use the app store to push a targeted update just to some.

Yes, an operating system that uses a compromised software supply chain is at risk of compromise, but that really has nothing to do with e2ee.

E2EE itself as a concept is ridiculous. The word was stolen from networking, end to end, and repurposed for an entirely different and non-sensical context to describe sth completely else. It has to do with "E2EE" because the biggest provided of it, Signal, pushes you to use 'compromised software supply chains' that are iOS and Play Store, evensofar as to spreading FUD about alternative distribution mechanisms, like APKs. That's why you have to go over yourself to find the APK of the App on Signal's website.

I am very suspicious of Signal, for not not being on f-droid, but being on play store.

I'm sure the protocol is fine and all, but playstore can easily be used to compromise everything anyway.

Also I've read many times Bruce Schneier claim that Signal is the most secure communication system that exists, and Whatsapp is the 2nd best, because it (allegedly, but we don't know) uses the same protocol.

Do you think F-Droid is more resilient to malicious influence than Google's Play Store?

I haven't looked deeply into how F-Droid is currently operating, so maybe I'm off here, but isn't it just all on a server run by some random guy in his free time? I love what F-Droid is doing, and I think it has a bright future, but in its current state I would never trust it on any of my devices that I use for anything important.

Also, yeah, it really is super easy to crack open the WhatApp APK and confirm that it is, in fact, using libsignal. That would be kind of a weird thing to lie about, since anyone could quickly call them out on it.

Using libsignal doesn't mean that there is no API to enable a side channel :)

I think that google and apple would just comply and do whatever they are told, while the f-droid guy needs to be hacked and might notice he got hacked, so in that sense it's safer.

Them not being on F-Droid is justifiable because F-Droid app IS less secure than alternatives. It does not use modern Android session installer, which is problematic in many different ways. Granted, there are third party F-Droid apps like Droidify that fix these issues.

How is it less secure than the play store?

No need, push an update to all that only affects certain users. But if anyone ever de-obfuscates that, your reputation is gone.

If you push only to some it's less likely to ever be detected.