This is so obvious and so "acceptable" even in security circles that I have thought for a while that it is a tacit acknowledgement that state actor attacks are "OK".
Trusted CAs should be one of the most scrutinized and controversial aspects of system configuration, and OSes should support a variety of trust models.
I've run this by a few security "experts" and the response has always been that it's a UX issue and the goal is to have websites load correctly without the user seeing and complaining about opaque security errors.
It's quite absurd. The rewards for compromising a single CA are so great that surely most state actors have succeeded in doing it at least once.
Trusted CAs should be one of the most scrutinized and controversial aspects of system configuration, and OSes should support a variety of trust models.
I've run this by a few security "experts" and the response has always been that it's a UX issue and the goal is to have websites load correctly without the user seeing and complaining about opaque security errors.
It's quite absurd. The rewards for compromising a single CA are so great that surely most state actors have succeeded in doing it at least once.