I also grew up in a Christian house and am now atheist--I never understood how people could reconcile "church shopping" for a community that aligns with their views (e.g. not homophobic) with the notion that the core religious concepts are supposed to be infallible. If you disagree with various churches on some doctrinal/sociological point, how do you know that your current church is correct on God existing, or knowing what he wants?
Part of my de-conversion was driven by what looked to me like people willfully deceiving themselves that it was possible to "choose" a church who fit their worldview, without treating the cosmology claims the church inherently makes with the same skepticism.
I get what you're saying, but there's plenty of disagreement on what those concepts even are.
td;dr: Denominations vary wildly, and it's almost impossible to separate one's personal biases from choosing a congregation.
For example, Catholicism is very heirarchical, stating that one cannot receive salvation except through the Catholic Church. Methodism states that good acts + belief are the gateway to heaven. Lutheranism promises salvation to all that believe in Christ.
Or take the infallibility of the Bible. The Roman Catholic faith places a lot of emphasis on church doctrine, which is based on the Bible to be sure, but also a lot of church constructs. Baptists believe in a very literal interpretation of the Bible. Mainline protestants emphasize historical context and nuance. ELCA does not even claim the Bible is the literal word of God.
Plus, individual congregations within a denomination might have differences in emphasis, sociopolitical leanings, etc. It's important to know that "The Church" is in many cases, and especially for Protestant denominations, made up of congregations from the bottom up, and reflects the aggregate of its membership.
I talk about this more in another reply [1], but I'll restate here:
If it's possible for all these varied denominations to come to wildly different conclusions about god, the world, and his desires for us, all based off the same source materials and epistemological tools (e.g., faith)--differences that're important enough to have fought wars and divided nations over--why then do people believe these source materials and tools are still a reliable way to determine how one should live their life?
The fact that these huge disagreements exist is evidence to me that the bible specifically and religious texts generally aren't reliable systems to learn about the world.
What frustrates me is people who "church shop" seem to be aware of this, because they're seeking a church that is similar enough to their existing beliefs yet the indicators of that are difficult to find because even within the same denomination a specific population can hold different beliefs, yet they don't extrapolate to the wider issue of the base beliefs being the issue.
Have you ever watched a press conference after a sports game and the losing coach is convinced that all the calls went against his team? And then the other coach gets up and starts talking about the calls that went against his team? One could conclude that there is not a reliable way to determine when fouls should be called. And in some sports for some rules that comes into play. But a much larger factor is just self-interest. A man with a great desire to win will be blind to objective reality, all the while fully convinced that he is utterly in the right.
There are very different views on what the United States Constitution means and requires. Arguments about it are had on the internet daily, in congress frequently, in the court system constantly, and there was once even a war over it. One could conclude that the Constitution is such a badly written document that you can make it mean whatever you want it to mean, but I see here the work of self-interest. When the stakes are sufficiently high, men are geniuses at convincing themselves that what they want to be true, is true.
For churches claiming that they believe the bible to be the divinely inspired word of God, the stakes are very, very high. In consequence, the incentives to convince yourself that the bible says what you want it to say are also extremely high. Self-deception thrives under those conditions.
I'm not completely certain what you're stating, so I apologize if I assume the wrong meaning. Please do correct me if that's the case.
> One could conclude that there is not a reliable way to determine when fouls should be called.
One certainly could conclude that, but it seems strange to me to give equal weight to the opinions of those who're most invested in the outcome. I would instead turn to a more objective measure--either the calls of the officials, or even a close reading of the rules and reviewing all the available observations of the event.
> One could conclude that the Constitution is such a badly written document that you can make it mean whatever you want it to mean...
I would certainly agree that there are many points on which the Constitution is unclear or poorly written :) The caveat of the constitution is that we don't have to exist alongside its poor meanings for eternity with no recourse--We the People are imbued with the ability to clarify and update the constitution, a power we've used many times to correct its shortcomings.
If I am to take your use of the Constitution as an analogy to the Christian bible, the opposite is true of that bible: we're unable to clarify and update it where flaws are discovered, and must continue to exist with it as the supposed-word-of-God in its current form. Just as with the Constitution, it is possible that new interpretations of the text can develop, but it's impossible to decide if they are truly "correct" with regard to authorial intent--something much more important of the bible than the constitution.
> Self-deception thrives under those conditions.
I absolutely agree. Part of what frustrates me about conversations around religious accuracy is that the stakes are (typically) set so, so much higher for the religious party: the threat of damnation, eternal torment, and not being able to see one's deceased loved ones make a powerful incentive to overlook otherwise obvious shortcomings in one's reasoning.
Because on the main point, they're all pretty much aligned: Salvation is achieved through Jesus's death on the cross. And fundamentally, it's the only thing that really matters in Christianity.
In that respect, shopping for churches is mostly irrelevant. What you see as fundamental differences are really more social than theological, in which case the shopping around makes a lot of sense.
"the bible specifically and religious texts generally aren't reliable systems to learn about the world."
I think most mainline Christians would reject the notion that the Old Testament is a factual historical record. (Less so for Evangelical and Pentecostal, however). Religion teaches us "why", not "what".
This is not an attack, just something I have wondered and your comment "Salvation is achieved through Jesus's death on the cross." reminded me of it. Jesus dying essentially allowed God to forgive humanity and allow for salvation. Why worship a God that was willing to destroy humanity and required a blood sacrifice of his own son instead of just saying, you know what, I forgive you. Why is an entity like that worthy of worship for any reason other than fear? Please note, not trying to attack your faith here, just wondering on your opinion.
Edit: Thought about it a little more and I guess fear is a pretty legitimate reason to do so. If one truly believes that if one does not worship then an eternity in hell is on the plate then worshipping does make sense but it cant be anything except a Stockholm syndrome style of worship.
This is one of the most widely asked questions about Christianity, so I have some skepticism that you are asking in good faith, but I will assume so nonetheless.
The arguments generally revolve around the tension between justice and forgiveness.
Jumping to forgiveness elides the question of sins and crimes and injustices that demand punishment, atonement, reparation, consequences.
How can God welcome everyone into Paradise, oppressor alongside oppressed, murderer alongside murderer, rapist alongside their victims, and every other kind of perpetrator of evil and those they have trespassed against?
The Cross is meant as a way of reconciling this tension, and a great many sermons have been devoted to trying to explain the mystery of it.
> This is one of the most widely asked questions about Christianity...
Perhaps because existing answers are unconvincing to those asking :)
To that end:
> How can God welcome everyone into Paradise, oppressor alongside oppressed ... ?
Your god supposedly made this universe, and dictated the laws that govern it--metaphysical and otherwise. I have a difficult time making excuses for oddities in those laws alongside that.
From the outside, it all looks like a bit of a cup game [1]: We have sinned against god, and have been stained eternally by that. God demands punitive justice for our transgressions, yet we cannot redeem ourselves independently, by god's laws. The only way to wash the sin from ourselves is for god to send himself (which is also his son?) to die for our transgressions, satisfying this punishment (though he'll be raised 3 days later), such that we can then pass into his kingdom.
(1) Apologies for irreverence, this just sounds like when a bunch of 3 year olds are playing war in the yard:
"I shoot you with my laser!"
"Well my atomic armor blocks your laser!"
"But my laser is hooked up to my fusion backpack, and cuts through your atomic armor!"
etc.
(2) I don't understand how in any way this reforms us sinners that we may pass into heaven and exist alongside each other--we haven't undergone any transformation on our own such that we understand the terrible crimes we're supposedly guilty of; we're certainly (in the church's view) not any less likely to commit sin if we know about these crimes we've committed and the supposed significance that god himself had to die (but only kind of?) for them.
In either reformative or punitive justice, it makes no sense: we're no less likely to commit these sins by threat of punishment, because we can be forgiven simply by believing in Jesus. We also aren't any less likely to commit sin by being reformed because... we haven't reformed at all, we simply believe in this story.
I'd kindly request you to consider looking at this from a secular view, as if someone were proposing this as a system of justice in a secular context: Does this seem a reasonable way to structure a society, where those who break the laws of the society can send someone in their stead for reformation or punishment? I strongly doubt the efficacy of such a system, and I find it so strange that folks accept it in a religious context.
> The Cross is meant as a way of reconciling this tension, and a great many sermons have been devoted to trying to explain the mystery of it.
Perhaps god could have explained it more clearly and saved us all a lot of confusion :)
As it stands, I see no reason to believe this tension exists in the first place. In order for this explanation to make sense I first must subscribe to your premises--that god exists, that we're guilty of eternal sin which we're unable to address ourselves, etc--which I see no reason to do.
Until parent poster chimes in . . . :-)
The reason God is not "just saying, you know what, I forgive you", has to do with His system of justice and righteousness.
As the final Judge and Creator of the law, sin must be judged.
You are either committing a sin or you are not. Jesus dying on the cross for our sins does not change the fact we will be judged. But Jesus that had no sin, took our sin upon Him and paid the price of death that we really were to pay. By believing in Jesus Christ we take part in His death and resurrection, and as a result: An everlasting life with God.
About 800 years before the birth of Christ the prophet Isaiah wrote the following prophecy (Isaiah 53:5-6):
"But he was pierced for our transgressions,
he was crushed for our iniquities;
the punishment that brought us peace was on him,
and by his wounds we are healed.
6 We all, like sheep, have gone astray,
each of us has turned to our own way;
and the Lord has laid on him
the iniquity of us all."
I encourage you to read the the whole chapter of Isaiah 53 here:
My experience in life with self-identified Christians has largely been in the context of those people disagreeing, on moral grounds, with actions I take or people I support--almost always citing religion in their reasoning. It's possible the people I've dealt with just aren't components of this "mainline christianity" you're familiar with, but they use the same tools to believe these things. To me, those tools are egregiously flawed, and I have a vested interest in making sure those tools don't get used to believe false things that bring harm to myself or my neighbors.
> Because on the main point, they're all pretty much aligned...
Historically, wars have been fought over these disagreements--both within only Christianity, and in the wider religious space.
I think it's worth considering other religions personally because it's what led to my de-conversion: I couldn't answer the question of why, other than being raised in it, I should believe Christianity over, say, Buddhism or Islam. As I regarded other religions with skepticism, when I was a Christian, I should also regard Christianity.
While the specific point I've made previously deals with selecting a denomination and a church within that denomination it's also true that people choose religions for similar (flawed?) reasoning.
Further:
> What you see as fundamental differences are really more social than theological...
I'm not sure I'm convinced on this. Take gay marriage, for example: I vividly recall being 12 in our church, sitting in on a conversation between my (single) mother and our pastor, on how to deal with people who chose to sin in our lives, specifically referring to my father who was openly gay at the time. The church we went to was firmly against homosexuality, but was of the love-the-sinner-hate-the-sin cloth. On the upshot, they were relatively kind to those of the LGBT community, but they did still make it clear they did not support their "choices" and largely ostracized them--with reasoning that, in their view, was ensconced in theology.
While LGBT rights have certainly been a social issue throughout the world, I think dismissing this "difference" between my church and the one on my college campus who made a point of welcoming LGBT members is to minimize these actual theological differences. There's part of me that wonders if this is a bad-faith maneuvering (not on your part, but organized religion as a whole) to downplay socially repulsive beliefs without having to sacrifice their supposed moral authority.
> I think most mainline Christians would reject the notion that the Old testament is a factual historical record.
This certainly hasn't been true across history, and even now I harbor doubt. Perhaps I've only dealt with more fundamentalist types than you, but the opposite has been true in my experience, and is definitely not true of the more loudmouthed Creationist/Ken Ham style evangelicals. While they may not be representative of the majority, *they are affecting policy* in many regions of the country. My mother, an elementary teacher, frequently voices her frustrations that she's not allowed to pose creationism as an "alternative" to evolution in her classes science units--something that is allowed in several other states[1, though from 2014].
You see similar flaws in other arenas, too: my grandparents view climate change as an issue outside of human concern, squarely in God's hands, in part because they believe in life-after-death and the eventual rapture, so while they should do reasonably well to steward the planet, they don't think we're going to be here forever so it doesn't matter if Earth becomes an unlivable rock; while some may suffer the effects of an adverse climate, it won't matter when everyone's in heaven.
I also wonder about what motivates these changes in how doctrine is viewed. Supposing your right, what drove the digression that the Old Testament is not factual? I doubt it was the Church deciding on its own, outside of societal pressure. I'm sure it's because of pressure from those who found fault in the Old Testament teachings--those who were condemned by it, or ostracized by the churches of their time, and the Churches granted this concession without wholly usurping their power. But what about the next issue? Maybe folks are believing less in Noah's Ark, but how will they contend with folks who're trans, or polyamourus, or take issue with abstract (i.e., not historical) teachings of the bible like not rebelling against kings, for they have been ordained by God [2]?
> stating that one cannot receive salvation except through the Catholic Church
The contemporary position of the Catholic Church is that non-Catholic Christians and non-Christians can be saved. What you've said there will be read by many readers as saying that only Catholics will be saved, which is not the Catholic position at all, in fact it is the condemned heresy of Feeneyism.
Now, the Catholic Church also teaches that when non-Catholics and non-Christians are saved, they are saved through the Catholic Church – but in a mystical rather than visible way – so what you've said is literally true, but is prone to misinterpretation.
The differences are way over rated, especially between the denominations themselves.
If you look at the core statements of beliefs from various Christian denominations, you will find far more similarities than differences, especially around the core tenets of the faith.
This is unreasonable to me when both possible worldviews make such wide-reaching claims about reality, and require me to subscribe to particular rules and philosophies--especially when you consider these beliefs are in direct opposition to one another.
As the Christian god demands "You shall have no other gods before me" how can I freely consider participating in other religions alongside Christianity? Surely one of them must be closest to reality with its claims--unless I am to regard the demands these religions make of me merely as suggestions, or allegorical teachings? While that's certainly possible (and, I'm told, the case of the Greek and Roman gods), that's not how I often encounter religion in my life.
Typically it's being cited as edicts or prohibitions that must be followed, lest terrible things happen, and being used to motivate people's decisions around policy and behavior, policy and behavior which I've watched cause harm to myself and those I care about.
I find it a ridiculous proposition that a person could make a decision that would have such effects by seeing which of these contradictory things "resonates" with them, somehow.
> I also grew up in a Christian house and am now atheist--I never understood how people could reconcile "church shopping" for a community that aligns with their views (e.g. not homophobic) with the notion that the core religious concepts are supposed to be infallible. If you disagree with various churches on some doctrinal/sociological point, how do you know that your current church is correct on God existing, or knowing what he wants?
That doesn't actually seem like a problem specific to religion, but a problem with truth, generally. If anyone believes their beliefs are true, they have to reconcile that with the fact that people disagree, which usually proceeds by believing those people are in error or that the differences aren't significant. I don't think Christians actually believe that the truth is something easy to access, given the emphasis on faith and belief that everyone is flawed, etc.
> given the emphasis on faith and belief that everyone is flawed
Forgive my possibly abrasive tone, but "given the emphasis on faith and belief that everyone is flawed" falls apart when the focal point of the church and the religion it purports, the god, is held to be infallible.
The notion that all these disparate groups can cite the same 'source of truth' as their guiding principles, yet come to such significantly different conclusions as to fight wars over them shows those principles aren't as useful or reliable as members of any church make them out to be.
That's where my frustrations come in: churchgoers seem inherently aware of these intense differences, yet don't seem to question the reliability of their text (or view, or belief, or...) despite all these alternative conclusions from the same tools and evidence.
(In Street Epistemology the "Outsider Faith Test" is used to demonstrate this; broadly phrased, "If it is possible for a person of Hinduism to use faith to justify their belief in their god(s), and it's possible for a Christian person to use faith to justify their belief in their god, yet those beliefs are in opposition to one another, is faith a reliable tool to determine what is true?")
> Forgive my possibly abrasive tone, but "given the emphasis on faith and belief that everyone is flawed" falls apart when the focal point of the church and the religion it purports, the god, is held to be infallible.
Not really. That only falls apart under particular assumptions (e.g. an assumption that a perfect thing will only create other perfect things, or that perfection will be the particular kind you imagined it must be).
> (In Street Epistemology the "Outsider Faith Test" is used to demonstrate this; broadly phrased, "If it is possible for a person of Hinduism to use faith to justify their belief in their god(s), and it's possible for a Christian person to use faith to justify their belief in their god, yet those beliefs are in opposition to one another, is faith a reliable tool to determine what is true?")
I've got a pretty clear sense that there are regions of truth that our "reliable tools" cannot access. Faith is basically the hope that some of those regions can be accessed in other ways.
> there are regions of truth that our "reliable tools" cannot access
This is a contradiction in terms. If you have a set of tools such that some tools reliably determine truth and some don't, inherently that latter set can't be used to "access" other "regions of truth." Put differently, when I examine the universe with my reliable truth-tools (roughly, the scientific method), I see no reason to believe that these other regions of truth that my tools cannot detect exist. If I use tools that are demonstrably flawed, like faith, I can conclude those things are true, but why would I use known-bad tools to reason with?
It almost feels like a weird inverted understanding of object permanence; I can't see into the other room, so I cannot reliably determine what is inside it. It's possible since I left it that a ninja suck in and left a million dollars in my couch cushions, then retrieved it later--I would have no way to detect that from here, so my 'tools' can't determine that. Why would I choose to believe in the ninja?
It is possible that you could come to believe something that is true by faith (as in, "I have faith we live in a heliocentric solar system, although I cannot prove or determine this with my current set of tools"), you cannot use faith to prove that what you believe is true. A practitioner of Street Epistemology, Anthony Magnabosco, has a very good conversation [1] with someone on that very topic.
> This is a contradiction in terms. If you have a set of tools such that some tools reliably determine truth and some don't, inherently that latter set can't be used to "access" other "regions of truth." Put differently, when I examine the universe with my reliable truth-tools (roughly, the scientific method)...
You'll notice I put "reliable tools" in quotes. I do not think they are as reliable as you do. For instance, to give a secular example, they're unlikely to be able to give an answer to the simulation hypothesis. Say physics ultimately derives from a certain configuration in Conway's Game of Life, and that configuration is in-fact running on some kid's Hyperpentium 4 PC. Science may be able to access the truth of the configuration and game rules, but it's totally blocked from probing the region of truth beyond that. However, that block is one way, and the kid's totally capable of editing the configuration to add a message "LOL U DOODS R IN MY PC." Now (with or without the message) you may decide to have utter faith in your tools, and deny or dismiss as meaningless what they can't perceive, but that's just denial or averting your eyes. There is truth there, it's just outside the grasp of your tools.
I'm perfectly content to leave things such as the simulation hypothesis as "I don't know."
This is another tool in the Street Epistemology toolbox, one normally done at the start of the conversation: you display a container of tic tacs and ask if there's an even or odd number in there--your conversation partner shouldn't be allowed to closely examine the tic tacs. There is a 'true' answer, but it's impossible to determine from their vantage point: as such, what use is either stance? The only "correct" answer is to acknowledge while there may be a true answer, they're unable to determine it from there and as such they don't know.
My tools are perfectly reliable in the sense that they are reliable indicators of truth where they can be applied, e.g. to things that can be observed. You're completely correct in that if we are in a simulation they can only probe the bounds of the problem, and offer no answer as to if we are indeed in a solution (beyond if an observable event occurs that would indicate such)--but I don't feel compelled to choose a "side" on that issue, and I remain skeptical of people who choose to do so in the absence of evidence--the same skepticism I regard folks who believe in a god with an absence of evidence. They may be correct, depending on the claims they make about that god and it's ability to influence the universe, but I see no reason to allow that possibility to influence my life and decision making, just as I don't allow the simulation hypothesis to influence my decision making: having seen no evidence, why would I affect change in my life for this thing?
It seems as though we've disagreed on the meaning of "reliable tools"--I don't mean omniscient, I simply mean they're the best way I've found to believe things that are true with regard to reality; put differently, they don't yield false positives. (Though it's wholly possible for me to reach false conclusions, I am only human.)
> This is another tool in the Street Epistemology toolbox, one normally done at the start of the conversation: you display a container of tic tacs and ask if there's an even or odd number in there--your conversation partner shouldn't be allowed to closely examine the tic tacs. There is a 'true' answer, but it's impossible to determine from their vantage point: as such, what use is either stance? The only "correct" answer is to acknowledge while there may be a true answer, they're unable to determine it from there and as such they don't know.
So, I should conclude that I don't know if LIGO has ever detected gravitational waves? I am unable to determine that from my vantage point.
You could ascribe reasonable certainty that folks using the scientific method have accurately modeled the universe, as determined by their documented and repeatable experiments.
I've previously seen people phrase that as "having faith in the beliefs of others," which usually boils down to semantics on what "faith" means: I believe it is likely those people have observed the things they say they have, because of the nature of the scientific community and how these experiments are structured.
I also think we're getting rather far off the specific, original issue: the existence of a god. In my experience this has been the kind of thing a single individual can experiment with and reason around--at least, in all the ways people tend to give evidence for their belief in god:
(1) hearing him communicate with them in some way
(2) seeing him influence the universe in ways they'd expect a god to
(3) believing a god must have been necessary to create the universe due to its complexity/beauty/etc.
You'd contended (please do correct me if I've misunderstood your argument) that the tools I suggested--the scientific method--were incapable of determining what lies behind the observational curtain, which I agree is certainly true: if you can't observe a thing or its effects in any way, you cannot determine its existence. The thing we seem to get hung up on is what we should believe about what lies behind that curtain.
My stance is to take the null hypothesis and assume nothing exists beyond the curtain; at the very least, not a god that interacts with our world and the people in it as the Christian faith claims. In short, "I have not seen sufficient evidence to conclude a god exists."
Your stance seems to be that it is acceptable to believe facts about things beyond this curtain; that we are not in a simulation, that there is a god, etc, framed as having faith in those facts being true, despite observational tools not functioning in this realm.
The tic-tac example wasn't supposed to be an indictment of extrapolative beliefs from experience ("these people have reliably observed the universe before / predicted things / modeled things for years, it seems reasonable to continue to trust their motivations and methods"), just a demonstration of when "I don't know" is a more correct answer over taking a stance when observational tools have reached their limit.
> I also think we're getting rather far off the specific, original issue: the existence of a god.
Huh? I picked up that you're kinda evangelical and were drifting there, but that's not where we started and it wasn't actually the conversation I was having.
> My stance is to take the null hypothesis and assume nothing exists beyond the curtain;
Isn't that a little unreasonable? You see a floor, so you assume nothing exists on the other side because it blocks your vision?
> Isn't that a little unreasonable? You see a floor, so you assume nothing exists on the other side because it blocks your vision?
You keep taking my statements to strange extremes; I'm going to try to avoid metaphors for clarity.
I use observation and experimentation to determine true things about the world. I extend my belief in these things to other humans in the world who I believe practice observation and experimentation effectively; scientists, mostly.
When we reach the limits of these observation and experimentation based tools, like with the simulation hypothesis, I stop and say "I don't know." By the fact these things and their effects cannot be experimented on or observed, they also cannot affect my life, so why bother making conclusions that I can't verify and won't affect me anyway?
In the case of a god who created the universe, has an interest in my life, has declared certain things to be "right" and certain things to be "wrong," and hypothetically takes action in my life (e.g., the common Christian understanding), this is well within what can be observed and experimented on. As such, I take the null hypothesis like a good scientist: I don't assume there is some god and begin running experiments to determine _which_ one is there, I assume there is _no_ god and begin looking for any evidence that shows there is _any_ god.
In my experience thus far in life, I have not encountered any evidence that makes me suspect there may be any god of any kind, and certainly not the one of the Christian description.
Your original statement was:
> I've got a pretty clear sense that there are regions of truth that our "reliable tools" cannot access. Faith is basically the hope that some of those regions can be accessed in other ways.
The implication I read here is that you believe in things that cannot be demonstrated through observation and experimentation, and that it is reasonable for people to use faith to support these beliefs.
My frustration is with people who make claims about things in those regions without any way of actually demonstrating them, and then making life- and policy-based decisions around those beliefs that affect me and others in the world.
I've tried to convey why this seems unreasonable to me, and you keep taking my points to strange extremes that seem disconnected from our original discussion.
To return to your floor metaphor (which may be a poor choice on my part): I see a floor, and I assume there is no dragon in the basement that I must not aggravate because I've never seen any sign of any dragon, why would I worry about that?
Hopefully my tone isn't misinterpreted because I genuinely appreciate the openness in your approach and thoughtfulness throughout this thread. I'm just curious to get your thoughts, admittedly some of these questions are rhetorical.
What experiments have you performed to prove the "null hypothesis"? How do you respond to those who claim they've experimented on their faith and found sufficient evidence to assert their belief?
Isn't "taking the null hypothesis" at some level still making a choice of belief? Doesn't that assumption introduce some amount of skepticism and bias into the measurement? What if the proof requires some amount of willful credulity? What if it's designed to be bestowed 'line upon line' and 'precept upon precept' after 'asking in faith' 'believing that' you will 'receive'.
I've found that starting this particular hypothesis under the premise that there is a God who has crafted a plan that requires the use of your agency to regain His spirit and influence in your life tends to yield better results.
No worries :) I love these kinds of conversations.
I'll give a personal anecdote before I start slingin' scientific/philosophical language: My de-conversion started when, as a teenager, I asked myself if I only believed in Christianity (instead of, say, Islam or Buddhism or Hinduism) because I was raised in the church--and that if I'd been raised in some other religion, I would instead believe that. (I'll use this example to better frame the null hypothesis question later, but it's useful to keep in mind as I explain.)
> What experiments have you performed to prove the "null hypothesis"?
This is a minor misunderstanding of what a "null hypothesis" is and how we interact with it. A null hypothesis is basically the assumed-default of the world, based on the fewest assumptions. Any theory you may be investigating may be an alternative hypothesis, but the way you go about collecting data is less about proving an alternative and more about disproving the null.
To be maximally pedantic, science is about constructing models that most accurately model the real world. If the data contradicts a model, then it clearly isn't reliable, and we make adjustments to the model--so we would never "prove" any hypothesis, null or otherwise, we would just find that the data more and more supports a specific hypothesis (over some others).
This philosophical block of text from Wikipedia explains why we frame the null in this way pretty well:
A negative claim is the opposite of an affirmative or positive claim.
It asserts the non-existence or exclusion of something.
The difference with a positive claim is that it takes only a single
example to demonstrate such a positive assertion ("there is a chair
in this room," requires pointing to a single chair), while the inability
to give examples demonstrates that the speaker has not yet found or
noticed examples rather than demonstrates that no examples exist
[from 1]
So when applied to our god claim, it looks something like this: I see people making saying things like
(a) god has had influence on our past (in dictating his laws to people, performing miracles, the resurrection etc)
(b) god has influence in the present (he can communicate with people, either directly into their mind or by influencing the world around us; enabling certain outcomes to occur, like getting a specific job or having a good surgery outcome)
While (a) is a little hard to test 'cuz I don't have a time machine and the historical record is opaque at best, (b) is a series of positive claims that can be observed and tested against the null of god not existing or not having any influence over our reality.
Were I to invert the null, and assume that there is a god, it's possible I could construct my experiments poorly: suppose I pray that I'll get a raise at my job, and the next week my manager tells me I'm getting a raise. Is this evidence that god exists and is influencing my life? Perhaps my boss was just motivated out of my work performance over the past few months. If I'm assuming that god exists, I could easily count this as evidence without that being the case.
Suppose the opposite happens, and I don't get my raise: What does this have to say about our god question? It might be that my raise "doesn't fit god's plan", and he had his own reasons not to grant my request--the typical explanation I hear from believers. It could also be simply that I did not meet my boss's expectations for deserving a raise and it was unreasonable for me to expect one, godly influence or no.
If you loop this over a lifetime of experiences, it's very probable that you'll run into a series of events where god seems to be at work, i.e. you pray for things and they happen, or you have some fortunate luck occur, or whatnot, that you're happy to attribute as evidence to god existing--even if there's perfectly mundane explanations for each of these occurrences. You could be wrong that there is a god, yet merrily believing such because of this poor logic chain. Broadly this is "confirmation bias," [2] or "only counting the hits." You see this with things like when you buy a new car: suddenly you start seeing that car everywhere. In reality, nothing has changed in terms of the percentage-distribution of cars in your local area: you're just now more predisposed to notice the kind of car you have than you were before, so it "feels" like there are now more of them.
You may ask (and apologies if I'm straw-manning), "What if God's actions are simply indistinguishable from the mundane chance?" In science we would say that said effect would be "statistically insignificant"--if you cannot reasonable separate the effect of some thing from random chance, then it's unreasonable to conclude that the "some thing" has influence on what you're observing.
You see this in medical trials with what's called "the placebo effect" [3], where doctors will run a study where some group of people get actual (new) medicine and some group get sugar pills, and yet another group will get nothing; there are many, many cases where the sugar-pill group (the "placebo" group) display effects _different_ than the "control" group who got nothing. If the results of the group who got real medicine are similar in magnitude to those who got the sugar pills, then it'd be unreasonable to conclude that the medicine is having a real effect, since that effect can also be demonstrated by not-real-medicine.
To your questions:
> Doesn't that assumption introduce some amount of skepticism and bias into the measurement?
You're absolutely correct :) Some atheists also use the 'skeptic' label, as it more widely describes their approach to life beyond just their religious beliefs. Bias I would question--would a similar bias not be introduced by assuming there were a god? (I'd argue I've demonstrated quite a significant bias would be introduced.)
If you remember my anecdote from the beginning, I had the question of if I only believed Christianity because I was raised in it, vs these other religions. One way to frame the experiment would be to assume Christianity was correct, and begin collecting evidence: but this would leave me open to the "confirmation bias" of attributing events to a god who may not actually exist. Defaulting to the null hypothesis of there not being any god, and requiring myself to be convinced otherwise, allows me to be much more sure that *were* such an existence to be demonstrated, that it would indeed be true with regard to reality.
> How do you respond to those who claim they've experimented on their faith and found sufficient evidence to assert their belief?
Generally I ask them to walk me through their beliefs and their experiments, in the vein of Street Epistemology. I highly, highly, highly recommend watching a few of Anthony Magnabosco's videos [4] on the subject. He does an amazing job of taking a calm, reasoned, conversational approach and demonstrates many of the techniques and tools I've cited and talked about, with a variety of people on a variety of claims--though typically claims about God. In the interest of full disclosure, Anthony is an atheist, but these conversations are much more of a Socratic dialogue exploring beliefs than they are a debate.
Returning to your question, I have not yet had a conversation with a believer whose evidence I found convincing, typically due to flaws in their reasoning akin to the above. A few months ago I even read several books one such believer recommended to me ("Mere Christianity," "The Problem of Pain," and "Should We Fire God?") on the basis that those books were part of what helped build their faith, and I only came out the other side even more disillusioned about their ability to rationally engage with the subject.
> I've found that starting this particular hypothesis under the premise that there is a God who has crafted a plan that requires the use of your agency to regain His spirit...
This is a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy, with regard to confirmation bias: If I begin looking for signs that there is the Christian god, and I allow myself to count what would otherwise be mere coincidences (or possibly very likely outcomes that I mistakenly though unlikely), I would merrily begin finding this evidence: not because it's good evidence, but because my premise is flawed. Suppose alternatively there is a god, but it's the god of Islam, or of Judaism? A lot of that evidence could support the Christian premise, but still not lead me to the correct conclusion if I'm starting from the Christian default.
I currently see no reason to believe that there is any god with such a plan requiring me to suspend my reasoning--and I would charge that any god that required me to suspend my reasoning in order to be led to believing in him (especially if that belief is demanded, lest I be punished eternally) is a god of poor moral standing.
> What if the proof requires some amount of willful credulity?
Thanks for laying all of this out. I'll say up front that I believe in God (member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints) so you know where I'm coming from. You obviously understand this stuff at a high level, and I won't claim to. I had a question about experimenting with proving (personally, at least) God's existence based on what you've explained.
>(b) god has influence in the present (he can communicate with people, either directly into their mind or by influencing the world around us; enabling certain outcomes to occur, like getting a specific job or having a good surgery outcome)
Your example experiments after this point talk about proving God exists through outcomes. I agree that experiments in this realm based on outcomes are bad. As you said, outcomes can have many different, non-divine causes; and it is impossible to observe the actual source. But what about the first point "he can communicate with people, either directly into their mind..."? What if you designed an experiment that tested whether God exists by testing if He can communicate with you? What about something like Clayton Christensen's experiment[1]? His experiment is more about a religious text than God Himself, but could something like that provide a framework for disproving the null at least?
> You obviously understand this stuff at a high level, and I won't claim to.
I'm flattered, but I merely consider myself a talented amateur who perhaps enjoys this subject of discussion more than is reasonable, and thus have spend an inordinate amount of time on it.
> What about something like Clayton Christensen's experiment[1]?
A critically important point in science, especially dealing with psychological matters, is knowing that the human brain for all its power is an incredibly fallible tool: it's memory is subpar [1] and it's willingness to identify patterns dangerously strong [2]. To this end, we have to design our experiments knowing that our brains will see causality where there may be none, and mis-remember data according to both our hopes and our doubts.
A second point is that an effective experiment must be (a) convincing to those who see it (with regard to the proposed conclusions) and (b) repeatable, such that those who doubt can run the experiment themselves, observe the results, and test their alternative explanations. I've seen many a scientist simultaneously sad that their hoped-for explanation was not supported by an experiment, or that their results were shown to be incorrect by another in their field adapting their experiment, but that same scientist was intensely glad for the fact that their model of the world was now more accurate.
Broadly in Street Epistemology, a methodology that lead to belief in multiple contradictory beliefs across a population is not a useful methodology for determining truth: this is an extension of the "Outsider Faith Test" I discuss somewhere up this thread. But, generally, if person A can use a methodology to conclude god A exists, and person B can use the same methodology to confirm belief in god B, then the methodology is not useful to discern realities. With more concrete examples, I've seen people claim to be filled with some emotion or spirit during Pagan rituals, or followers of the Hindu gods feel like they were having conversations with their gods, or Christians report being filled with spirit while singing hymns in their cathedrals. Since these are all effectively the same methodology--strong emotion during a worship based experience--it's reasonable to doubt that "strong emotion during a worship based experience" is a useful indicator in the existence of a specific god.
My explanation, perhaps typical of a non-believer, is that human psychology is predisposed to having these experiences, akin to the feeling of something being behind you as you ascend the dark basement stairs, or a feeling of wonder as you see how tiny your town is from a neighboring mountain: while these experiences evoke incredibly strong emotions, they aren't indicators of some supernatural power.
> His experiment is more about a religious text than God Himself, but could something like that provide a framework for disproving the null at least?
If Clayton's experiment were about disproving the null, it would have to be designed around showing the null hypothesis "there is no god" to be false. As it stands, his experiment just shows that he can have a strong emotional reaction to a text he reads late at night while praying that he has some reaction to the text he's reading. To properly disprove the null of "there is no god", or more specifically "this feeling was not caused by a god" he would have to demonstrate that either (a) the god explanation has the strongest relationship over any alternatives, or (b) that no other explanations apply. This would involve things like disproving the experience "just being within his head", or caused by his usual feelings around that time of night, or that they were reproducible in a devout atheist, or similar.
This is broadly the issue when citing individual, personal experience as evidence: it is most often collected by those with an existing bias to the results, e.g. believers hoping to have their beliefs confirmed, and it certainly can't stand up to scientific rigor (repeatable with results observable from other parties, in ways that dispel other possible explanations).
For my part, I experience incredibly intense emotions when I'm listening to recordings of communications between Air Traffic Controllers and pilots in emergency situations; in fact, in the past several years those recordings are the only thing that have moved me to actual tears. Waves of emotion about how lonely it must be to be such a pilot, even as you hear ATC routing other traffic around you, or the professional strain in the ATC's voice as they're routing search-and-rescue craft to the scene, or the intense relief when the pilot confirms they're OK after a landing. Is it reasonable for me to conclude that it's in these moments that god chooses to visit me, and fill me with concern for the pilot or gratitude for the ATC or calm over some future trip I'm to take? Or just to acknowledge that when I listen to these recordings, alone in a hotel room while traveling after a long day, I'm likely more predisposed to these emotions than I am normally?
For Clayton's part:
During my adult life I have been blessed to witness or participate in many miracles – events that the scriptures term “gifts of the Spirit.” I have healed the sick by the power of the God.
Were he such a fantastic healer, driven by the power of God, why is he not sweeping the nation, curing all the otherwise-incurably sick? Surely this would be a stunning display of God's power, consistently demonstrable by Clayton and attributable solely to his god?
>Were he such a fantastic healer, driven by the power of God, why is he not sweeping the nation, curing all the otherwise-incurably sick?
A) He's dead[1]
B) Jesus did this, and, as you can imagine, people weren't willing to see this as "attributable solely to his god". Even I can think of other explanations (e.g., fraud) if a person were going around the country loudly proclaiming themselves to be using God's power to heal anyone and everyone.
Thanks for taking the time to respond! I wasn't sure you'd see it since I got to this thread late. Glad to be engaged in a respectful discussion on a contentious topic that is dear to me.
>This is broadly the issue when citing individual, personal experience as evidence: it is most often collected by those with an existing bias to the results
Yes, I agree here. Maybe I bungled it, but I was not attempting to prove God exists through this one person's experience. Just examining it as an example of a repeatable experiment.
>reproducible in a devout atheist
I would disagree here. A devout atheist presumably has a very strong bias against finding out God exists or interpreting an experience as something supernatural. So maybe "reproducible in a [dispassionate, neutral party]"?
>To this end, we have to design our experiments knowing that our brains will see causality where there may be none, and mis-remember data according to both our hopes and our doubts.
I just wonder if this is an excuse people use for never trying it out at the individual level. A person can say in their heads or out loud "God, are you there?" and observe the results. Of course, there's the question of how long one needs to go through with this. But scientists are often patient and willing to go to great lengths to prove something[1][2]. I don't blame anyone who is not willing to go through with the effort in something they see as pointless as long as they don't take the failure of one or two attempts as proof that God does not exist. E.g., Higgs et al. in a parallel universe quitting before decades passing and before having a multi-billion dollar machine doesn't prove that the Higgs boson doesn't exist.
Maybe my experiment as stated isn't it, but I think there can be a convincing and repeatable experiment along those lines. Millions of people have repeated it and experienced something convincing (to them) (I'm not trying to use "Millions of people" as proof that all of us are right or anything. Just that it can be/has been repeated). But, for sure, it is unknown whether the millions of people and I interpreted the outcome according to their hopes. I think that's why it's worth it for every individual to try for themselves.
>his experiment just shows that he can have a strong emotional reaction to a text he reads late at night while praying that he has some reaction to the text he's reading.
It is true that even very real spiritual experiences can be explained in other ways. So, you're right, the experience still has to be accepted by the observer as from God. Because I believe in an omniscient God who knows you personally, I think you'll experience exactly what you need to experience exactly when you need to experience it. I won't claim it will be irrefutable proof, but maybe it'll be enough to make you want to keep digging.
Thanks for the response. With that explanation I better understand the “null hypothesis” and how you would attempt to “disprove the null”. This makes me believe it could be done in a way where an omniscient and merciful God would knowingly discern such efforts as earnest and sincere. Perhaps answers could be found this way. I think this is an acceptable methodology that could be applied by a sincere truth seeker and still achieve the same outcome I experience, with admittedly a less biased premise.
A conversion in this way would certainly come with an increased accountability and is perhaps why it’s more difficult to come by. Being convinced absolutely and not willing to adhere comes with more dire consequences if one is to believe scriptural record—which admittedly sounds a bit foreboding but may be more merciful than one might assume at first glance. There are even scriptural accounts of similar things being done successfully (see Paul’s experience on his road to Damascus, or if you’re willing to venture into my brand of Christianity see Alma’s experience in chapter 36 of the Book of Mormon).
However, I do think the premise of God helps me understand and open new avenues of thought. Personally, I started from the assumption that an Omniscient being, capable of designing the very reality we perceive and live in, can probably come up with a way to “test” and “prove” us in a way that protects our ability to make our own choices yet extends enough grace to satisfy the demands of justice. If I were obligated to believe because I could not refute the evidence, I don’t know how effective that would be of a test to prove I’ve become what I’m supposed to be. Personally I think this Plan works whether you get behind a belief system or not.
I have very much appreciated the insights you’ve shared. You are right, I could be wrong, and have become heavily indoctrinated with a healthy dose of confirmation bias. But for me at least, I’ve found something that I receive great benefit and perspective from. I recognize it won't be that for everyone.
while I think this is a sensible stance for most highly educated people, for most this just is something they can not cope very well with. And I think that these "simple" minds are then prone to all the other cults out there (like QAnon - what is it else than replacing things people can't know about with faith.) - and from their teachings these are _much_ worse.
> how do you know that your current church is correct on God existing, or knowing what he wants?
The answer is that you don't, and unfortunately society doesn't look too kindly on taking copious amounts of psychedelics and wandering the desert for a month, so unfortunately it ain't as straightforward to rediscover it from first principles like Jesus did.
> I also grew up in a Christian house and am now atheist--I never understood how people could reconcile "church shopping" for a community that aligns with their views (e.g. not homophobic) with the notion that the core religious concepts are supposed to be infallible.
Couldn't you compare that to deciding between colleges? They all presumably will teach you information that is true, yet the academic culture and their perspectives on the more subjective aspects may differ between them. In academia, this sort of disagreement between schools of thought is generally considered a good thing. Not sure folks are as happy about disagreement when it comes to theology, but there certainly isn't a shortage of it there either.
> Couldn't you compare that to deciding between colleges? They all presumably will teach you information that is true
Not even close. No one expects their college to impart infallible, ultimate, eternal truth. You expect to be trained in useful theories and practices, and for them to become outdated in due time. Academic disagreements are all part of the dynamic, living, changing reality of academic knowledge. Not so for final truths of what’s right and wrong, true and false.
Maybe that’s why fundamentalists make such lousy arguments in defense of creationism: “science is wrong a lot of the time so how can you trust it?” They’re evaluating academic knowledge through the lens of ultimate truth.
Part of my de-conversion was driven by what looked to me like people willfully deceiving themselves that it was possible to "choose" a church who fit their worldview, without treating the cosmology claims the church inherently makes with the same skepticism.